Security without logins
Most attacks on a content management system go through its front door: login page, session, admin panel, plugins. A CTXR site has none of those.
No front door
No login form, so nothing to guess passwords against, phish, or reuse a leaked password on. No sessions, so nothing to hijack. No plugins, so no third-party code that goes out of date. A visitor can only read the site — and so can a bot.
Writing goes through one place: the MCP, where an agent presents a key. The site stores a fingerprint of each key, never the key itself, with its rights. An exposed key is replaced, and the old fingerprint stops matching. A site with no keys is closed until the owner hands out the first one.
Rights are small and explicit
A key’s rights are cells in a table: per kind of file, read, write or remove; and separately, publish or take back. No role implies more than it says, nobody hands out more than they hold, and a refusal names the missing right. Templates are code, so that right is given rarely. The grid and the delegation rules: Who can do what.
Nothing reaches the site unchecked
Every file an agent sends in is judged before it becomes a draft, against a definition of what may exist in the site: content must be valid structured data, an image must actually be an image (bytes, not name), a vector graphic may carry no script, and executable files or raw web pages cannot be uploaded at all. Size limits apply per kind. What does not fit does not enter, and can never be handed out either.
Publishing runs a second check over the whole site as it would be: broken references, missing required fields, a template that does not parse. The site’s own code — its settings and helpers — is also started once in a sealed, throwaway copy before it may go live, so code that parses but breaks at start never reaches the site. That is a guard against mistakes, not against intent: the right to change templates is trust in whoever holds it. If the check cannot run or fails, nothing goes live; drafts are the only place a mistake can exist. See Drafts and going live.
The server side
The engine asks a host for little: the web server serves the public folder only — never keys, drafts, inbox, history, or templates as files — and every other request goes through one entry point. A content delivery network with a firewall in front is the recommended default: it absorbs floods and blocks known bad traffic. The MCP itself slows repeated failed attempts per address, so guessing keys is impractical even without the firewall.
What stays with you
Hand out keys with the least rights that do the job, and take them back when someone leaves. Protect the account behind your agent like the key (multi-factor on, no shared logins): whoever can use your agent can use the key. The change history includes the key fingerprints, so keep it private and replace the keys if it is ever exposed.